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Brownfield Legislation: A Viable
Option for the Southeast
LESLIE GOFF-SANDERS*
INTRODUCTION
Brownfield legislation is nothing new to the Midwestern states,
commonly known as the "Rust Belt."1 Environmental problems plague
many of the industrial sites in these states, and the urban areas have
experienced significant decline.2 Other areas have been affected as well.
For instance, in Minnesota the metropolitan area added 14,000 acres of
commercial property in a ten-year period, but only one percent of that
property was in actual urban areas.' Given this type of increase in
commercial and industrial property, it is not surprising that in Illinois,
officials found 329 polluted industrial sites in Cook County alone."
These statistics are representative of the entire Midwest region.
With environmental problems come the fear of strict liability
imposed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act5 (CERCLA or Superfund), and many state statutes
as well.6 Because of the pollution of the urban industrial sites many
would-be owners and operators have avoided these sites, seeking low-
risk undeveloped land. The result has been a desertion of the core urban
areas, and the state legislatures in the Midwest have had to take action
' Senior Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. J.D.
1997, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1994, Georgetown College.
I See Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-led Reform of Superfund
Liability, 10-Wtr NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 27,27 (1996).
2 Id. Daniel Michael, Comment, The CERCLA Paradox and Ohio's Response to the
Brownfield Problem: Senate Bill 221, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 435, 435-36 (1995).
Andrew, supra note 1, at 27.
4 Id.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The text of CERCLA
does not expressly state that parties are subject to strict liability; the courts have inferred this
standard. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); Michael
Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive
Approach, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 65, 86 (1992).
6 See Andrew, supra note 1, at 27.
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
to give some financial relief and incentive to developers.7 Thus, states
enacted brownfield legislation or statutes limiting at least state liability
for developers, thereby encouraging industrial development on sites
already contaminated-as opposed to polluting undeveloped sites.8
The threat of strict liability for environmental cleanup is not region
-specific. Every state falls within the purview of CERCLA, and the
pollution of industrial sites is certainly not a problem unique to the
Midwest. With over half a million properties nationwide showing
evidence of contamination for which cleanup cost will exceed $650
billion,9 states throughout the country have followed the lead of the
Midwest and enacted their own brownfield legislation."
This Note focuses on three southeastern states: Florida, Georgia
and Kentucky. These states were not chosen randomly; they were
selected for their individual efforts to enact brownfield legislation and
for their unique environmental problems. While these three states share
some common goals, the motivation for each state's brownfield efforts
differs. Furthermore, each state is at a different stage of brownfield
legislation development.
Before analyzing the selected brownfield statutes, however, some
background information concerning the necessity of this type of
legislation is required. This Note first briefly defines the brownfield
problem and the potential solutions. The next section explains the
various interests served by brownfield legislation including not only
environmental and economic concerns, but also the interests of
developers and lenders. Since the brownfield developers face the
possibility of dual liability, federal and state, the final portion of the
background section focuses on brownfield incentives enacted by the
federal government. This section sets the stage for a complete analysis
of the recent developments in Florida, Georgia and Kentucky.
7 Id.
Id. See also Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of Institutional Controls in Superfund and
Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 1 (1995).
' David F. Goossen, Contractual Allocation of Environmental Liabilities in Real Estate
Transactions, 25 COLO. LAW. 79, 79 (March 1996).
"o See generally R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup
Legislation, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 101 (1995).
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I. THE NEED FOR BROWNFIELD
LEGISLATION AT THE STATE LEVEL
A. The Brownfield Problem
Some definitions are in order before going any further.
"Brownfield" is a term referring to industrial sites known to be
contaminated that are generally located in urban areas. 1 "Greenfield,"
by contrast, refers to land that has never been commercially developed
and is thereby free of the environmental concerns of existing industrial
sites.' 2 "Brownfield legislation" or "brownfield statutes" refers to state
laws which encourage the redevelopment of the contaminated areas by
limiting the liability for environmental cleanup costs. 3 The basic
"brownfield problem" is that CERCLA and state counterparts impose
sweeping liability for the cleanup of contaminated sites; this in turn has
the effect of discouraging developers from locating on a site known to
be contaminated.' 4 Thus, urban industrial sites sit idle, and developers
move to greenfields to industrialize those areas.' 5
These developers are not merely lacking an environmental
conscience; the liability imposed by CERCLA is potentially devastating.
Congress made "potentially responsible parties" strictly liable for the
cost of cleaning up contaminated sites 6 in an effort to shift the burden
of cleanup from the public to the parties who caused the harm. 7
Furthermore, current and former owners face the possibility ofjoint and
several liability." As a result, a current landowner could face millions
of dollars in cleanup costs for damage he did not cause. 9
While the mechanics of brownfield statutes will be discussed in
greater detail throughout this Note, an actual example helps to illustrate
not only brownfield legislation at work, but also the significant impact
of the liability scheme of CERCLA and its many state counterparts. In
Borinsky, supra note 8, at 1; Sweeney, supra note 10, at 103-04.
2 See Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the
En'zronmental Risks ofAcquiringandReusing Contaminated Land, 27 CoNN. L. REv. 789, 792-93
(1995).
" Sweeney, supra note 10, at 103-04.
Andrew, supra note 1, at 27.
I ld. Tondro, supra note 12, at 791-92.
16 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See note 5, supra.
" Bell Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1993).
s ld. at 901-02.
'9 Andrew, supra note 1, at 28.
1996-97]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
Philadelphia, Publicker Industries Inc. recently agreed to pay $13.35
million to the federal government and $1 million to Pennsylvania in a
settlement.20 The amounts represent in part costs incurred by the EPA
in cleaning up Publicker's former liquor and industrial alcohol manufac-
turing plant site in Philadelphia." l Furthermore, Delaware Avenue
Enterprises has agreed to purchase the brownfield site and pay the EPA
and Pennsylvania $2.3 million and cooperate with future cleanup
activities.22 In return, Delaware Avenue Enterprises will not be held
responsible for any of the cleanup costs for past contamination.3
Delaware Avenue Enterprises most certainly would have been unwilling
to purchase the Superfund site had it faced the possibility of liability for
the multi-million dollar contamination caused by Publicker.
B. The Interested Parties
An overview of the various and, at times, competing interests
involved in the brownfield problem helps further the understanding of
the subject. These interests include environmental and economic
concerns of the community as well as the interests of developers,
landowners and lenders. States have considered these interests and
tailored their brownfield statutes accordingly. States such as Florida
seem to be driven by environmental and economic concerns, while
others such as Kentucky seem to be more concerned with developing a
more business-friendly approach.
1. Environmental Concerns
While Congress focused on enforcing the cleanup of hazardous
waste in the environment when it enacted CERCLA, the focus of
businesses has been to avoid liability.24 Although the threat of
CERCLA liability has caused some hazardous waste producers to go out
of business, it has likewise sent prospective purchasers to greenfields.
25
This causes two significant problems: first, development of greenfields





24 Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to
Redevelopment and Prospectsfor Change, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 285 (1995).
" Id. at 304.
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leads to pollution of pristine land, and secondly, the abandoned
industrial sites passed over by the prospective purchaser can cause
further environmental problems.26
Discouraging the use of brownfields sends developers to
greenfields, which results in a negative impact on the environment.
2 7
When industrial developers spread out to the undeveloped rural and
suburban areas, this adds to the total amount of industrialized land.28 In
other words, the environment would benefit if industrial contamination
was limited to certain areas as opposed to polluting additional areas.
Additionally, when brownfields are left unattended, they pose a
threat to the environment." Inactive industrial property causes
degradation of the environment.3" The land contains known contami-
nants that could spread throughout the soil and eventually seep into the
groundwater if cleanup does not occur. In Kentucky, for instance, the
ground is composed largely of karst terrain, meaning the contamination
travels quickly." When owners abandon brownfields, cleanup is
typically stalled, thus allowing contamination to spread.
2. Economic Concerns
Perhaps an even more pressing concern to state legislatures is the
economic impact of the brownfield problem. In addition to the
underlying disincentive to develop imposed by CERCLA, the migration
from brownfields to greenfields carries with it a host of economic
problems. While the decay of the urban areas due to the loss of big
industry is the most obvious economic problem, brownfields impact
small businesses as well.32
Many brownfields are located in the core urban areas, which
include low income areas.3   This leads to an obvious economic
conclusion: the discouragement of redeveloping urban industrial sites
26 Id. Sweeney, supra note 10, at 107.
27 Solo, supra note 24, at 304.
21 Robert S. Berger, eta]., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the Challenge
of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3 BUFF. ENvTL. L.J. 69,73 (1995).
" Sweeney, supra note 10, at 107.
30 Id.
"' Telephone Interview with Mark Feather, Attorney at Brown, Todd & Heyburn, Louisville,
Kentucky (Jan. 17, 1997)) [hereinafter Interview with Feather].
32 See, e.g., Colonial Properties, Inc. v. Vogue Cleaners, Inc., 86 F.3d 210 (1 th Cir. 1996)
(owner of a dry cleaner corporation was sued by his landlord for contribution under CERCLA).
3' Alan W. Armstrong, Brownfields Financing: Risks and Opportunities, 80 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
623, 625 (1996).
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results in stifling job creation and economic growth.3 4
In addition to the lack ofjobs in the urban areas, as a result of the
threat of Superfund liability many industry owners have chosen to let
their sites sit idle rather than attempting to engage in costly cleanup.35
The health risks posed by these contaminated sites as well as the
unaesthetic view of abandoned buildings has resulted in a decline in
property values of inner city residences.36
Some environmental justice proponents argue that the redevelop-
ment of brownfields in the urban areas poses a greater health risk to
minority communities.37 Thus, even though redevelopment of urban
industrial sites might provide minority residents with new jobs, it does
so as a trade-off for environmental health.3" Brownfield statutes do not,
however, purport to alleviate developers from all cleanup
responsibility. 9 Instead, the statutes limit the uncertain future liability
imposed on developers while still providing for voluntary cleanup of
contaminated sites.4 So long as state legislatures avoid implementing
cleanup standards that are too relaxed in urban areas, the revitalization
of the urban areas should please both environmental justice advocates
and urban redevelopment advocates.4
Cleanup liability is not unique to big industry. Small business
owners often face the financially devastating liability imposed by
CERCLA and its state law counterparts.42 Lending trends best exem-
plify this negative impact on businesses. For example, large businesses
can give accounts receivable, interests in large inventories, and stocks
and bonds as collateral for loans.43 By contrast, many small and startup
business can offer only real property as collateral to secure a loan.'
Id.
" Solo, supra note 24, at 302.
36 id.
" See generally, Anne L. Kelly, Reinvention in the Name of Environmental Justice: A View
From State Government, 14 VA. ENV'rL. L.J. 769, 780 (1995); see also Armstrong, supra note 33,
at 625.
3 Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment: Using
Stakeholder Theory to Craft Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 55 (1995).
31 See generally, Andrews, supra note 1, at 27.
40 id.
Kelly, supra note 37, at 780; see also Poindexter, supra note 38, at 56-7.
4 Robert F. Carangelo, Jr., "The Sins of the Son Should Be Visited Upon the Father":
Lender Liability Under CERCLA and New York State Law, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 631,651-52
(1990).
" Nicholas M. Kublicki, Shockwave: Lender Liability Under CERCLA After United States




Thus, since lenders do not want to end up as the "owner" of contami-
nated land and thus become liable under Superfund, they often refuse to
lend to small businesses.
Another significant impact on small businesses is the potential
liability corporate officers often face. In large corporations, officers
often do not meet the threshold requisite participation in the day-to-day
activities of the corporation in order to be considered "responsible
parties" under CERCLA.4 5 An officer of a small corporation, however,
will more likely play an active role in the daily operation of the business
and is thereby more susceptible to CERCLA liability.
46
Small businesses play an important role in job creation and
generate capital.47 Obviously, in small, rural communities, these
businesses are crucial to the economy. Thus, the threat of CERCLA
liability can stifle economic growth even in rural communities, not just
urban areas.
3. Developers' Interests
If Congress intended to draft legislation with the primary focus of
justly imposing liability, CERCLA would likely impose liability only
on the person or company responsible for the original contamination.
The focus of CERCLA, however, is to avoid spending taxpayer dollars
on cleaning up contaminated sites and to shift the financial burden to
private developers.4 Therefore, CERCLA imposes liability for the
cleanup on "potentially responsible parties," which includes not only the
former landowner who actually caused the contamination, but also the
current landowner.49 This liability is maximized for current landowners
since it carries a strict liability standard that is imposed jointly and
severally."0 Even if no significant immediate cost arises from the
cleanup of contaminated land, the possibility of undetected contamina-
tion caused by the previous owner suddenly rising to the surface leaves
"5 Donald M. Carley, Personal Liability of Officers Under CERCLA: How Wide a Net Has
Been Cast?, 13 TEMp. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 235,257-58 (1994).
46 Id.
" Kublicki, supra note 43, at 540.
" See generally, Melanie S. Marts, Kentucky's Efforts to Protect its Groundwater:
Uniqueness and Uniformity Among the States, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVrL. L. 371,388 (1994-
95).
41 Andrew, supra note 1, at 28; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2).
50 Id.
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the current landowner at risk." This liability has a chilling effect on
developers or purchasers of contaminated land.
Congress provided for an innocent owner defense in CERCLA 2
This defense allows current landowners to escape cleanup liability if
they conducted an investigation of the site and found no contamination
caused by previous owners of the land. 3 This defense is generally
unavailable to prospective purchasers of brownfields, however, since the
very label "brownfield" indicates known contamination of the site. 4
Thus, potential developers of brownfields cannot escape liability since
they qualify as a potentially responsible party with no real defense.5
This leaves one wondering why developers would have any
interest in locating on a brownfield. However, brownfields do have
some attractive features. For instance, brownfields by definition are
developed industrial or commercial sites; thus they already have a
necessary infrastructure in place including roads, water, sewer and
electric power lines.5 6 Furthermore, brownfields located in the core
urban areas have ready access to air, rail, and water transportation which
not only permits interstate shipment of products, but also international
trade. Finally, developers save a significant amount of money when
locating in already developed land as opposed to the undeveloped land
of a greenfieldi7
While these incentives may encourage a developer to locate on a
brownfield, the potential of continuing, immeasurable liability serves as
a significant deterrent for potential buyers. 8 Furthermore, when a
developer does decide to locate on a brownfield, he or she not only must
clean up the site, but must also investigate the site so as to determine the
extent of the requisite cleanup.59 The developer is responsible for both
the remediation costs and the investigatory costs.' Additionally, a
minimum of two years is required to investigate a site and obtain
5' Armstrong, supra note 33, at 627.
52 Id. see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
53 Id.
' Phillip H. Gitlen, Voluntary Cleanup Programs, I-Sum. ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 28
(1995).
"' The only defenses provided for under CERCLA other than the "innocent landowner"
defense are damages due to a release or threat of a release caused by an act of God or an act of war.
42 U.S.C. § 9670(b).
56 Sweeney, supra note 10, at 108.
57 Id.
's See generally Gitlen, supra note 54, at 28; Interview with Feather, supra note 31.




government approval of the remediation plan.6 Most potential
purchasers are unable to wait this long to begin developing.6" These
disadvantages to developing a brownfield site often outweigh the
location advantages.
6 3
In order for development of brownfields to occur, both the states
and the federal government must provide some relief from the endless
liability developers face. It seems clear that developers should pay for
the initial cost of cleaning up a contaminated area on which they want
to locate. However, the future risks that past contamination poses
should not be shouldered by potential buyers. If potential buyers
continue to shoulder such a burden, brownfields will remain abandoned
and contaminated.
4. Lenders' Interests
In 1990, the Eleventh Circuit made it clear that CERCLA's
sweeping liability encompasses lenders. In United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp.,' the court set forth the standard for determining whether
a lender could be held liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA. The
court announced an objective test focusing on the participation of the
lender in the financial management of the contaminated facility and
whether such participation rises to such a degree so as to permit the
creditor to influence the treatment of hazardous waste.65 Thus, lenders
can face liability even if they do not actively participate in the day-to-
day operation of the facility.66
Additionally, CERCLA imposes liability on owners or operators
of facilities. Such liability could ensnare a lender who takes possession
of a facility when the debtor defaults. 7 When a lender forecloses, it
becomes an owner, and courts may find it liable for cleanup costs.6"
Naturally, contaminated land does not make for good collateral nor does
it indicate a promise for cash flow for the borrower responsible for
cleaning up the contamination.9 Thus, CERCLA results in an
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Interview with Feather, supra note 31.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (2d. Cir. 1990).
63 Id. at 1557-58; see also Gitlen, supra note 54, at 28.
6 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58.
67 See generally Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
8 Id. at 1107; see also Gitlen, supra note 54.
6 Armstrong, supra note 33, at 626.
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inevitable reluctance on the part of lenders to loan funds for the
development of brownfields."I Since most developers cannot finance
the cleanup on their own, the lender liability issue is critical to the
redevelopment of brownfields.7
C. Federal Brownfield Development Incentives
While states have certainly been the leaders in encouraging the
redevelopment of brownfields," the federal government has likewise
made some effort to limit the draconian liability of CERCLA and
thereby encourage brownfield development. While this Note focuses
primarily on state efforts, it is essential to remind the reader that states
are limited in that they cannot relieve developers and lenders of federal
CERCLA liability." Thus, because both the states and the federal
government have jurisdiction over environmental cleanup, a discussion
about the state effort to redevelop brownfields is incomplete without
some mention of the federal effort.7" The efforts at the state level,
however, do have an impact on the federal liability as will be seen
throughout this Note."
Although the federal government and the EPA have not imple-
mented a federal voluntary cleanup program, they do endorse the state
efforts.76 For instance, Congress has recently introduced two bills which
are now in committees." The first is House Bill 200, introduced in
January, 1995. If passed, it will amend CERCLA7" so as to limit the
liability faced by lenders.79 It narrows the definition of "participation
in management" so that lenders who merely have the capacity to
influence management decisions are not liable absent actual participa-
70 Id.
71 Sweeney, supra note 10, at 161.
" See generally, Andrew, supra note 1, at 27; Paul C. Nightingale, Negotiating Contracts
for the Purchase and Sale of Contaminated Property, 10-Spg NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T I 1 (1996).
" Andrew, supra note 1, at 29.
7, See generally Gitlen, supra note 54, at 29; William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose:
Voluntary Contamination Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability,
80 MINN. L. REv. 35 (1995).
" Andrew, supra note 1, at 28.
76 Id. at 30.
" H.R_ 200,104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1621, 104th Cong. (1995). Both bills are currently
pending in the House committees on Commerce and Transportation and Infrastructure.
' 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20).
"' Elizabeth A. Perl, Lender Liability, 15 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 50,60 (1996).
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tion. 0 The amendment focuses on narrowly tailoring the potential
liability faced by lenders with a security interest in CERCLA sites."'
The second bill, House Bill 1621 introduced in May, 1995, proposes the
critical step the federal government must take in order to complete the
effort to revitalize brownfields. If passed, this amendment will allow
EPA to certify states to carry out voluntary cleanup programs for low
and medium priority CERCLA sites.8 2 The amendment entitled the
"Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment Act ' 83 states as its purpose
"to encourage cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated industrial
facilities (known as brownfields) as economically viable alternatives to
previously undeveloped greenfield sites."" Thus, potential purchasers
would deal only with the state in their cleanup efforts, which would
maximize the efficiency of the process and minimize the fear of dual
liability. In effect, the Act would eliminate federal involvement in the
cleanup of low to medium priority sites. 5
The President has "also recognized the need to redevelop
brownfields. In 1996, President Clinton proposed a $2 billion tax
incentive for potential purchasers of brownfields8 The plan allows
developers of brownfields to fully deduct cleanup costs for the year in
which they are incurred. 7 The President predicted that this would make
30,000 abandoned sites useful.8 Additionally, President Clinton's
proposed 1996 budget included an increase of approximately $100
million in the EPA's Superfund Response program which focuses on
economic redevelopment. 89 Furthermore, the President's 1997 budget
seeks funding for 25 additional cleanup pilot sites and $10 million more
to cleanup existing pilot sites.9°
The brownfield movement within EPA is perhaps the most critical.
Congress tied EPA's hands through CERCLA in that, while giving the
0 H.R. 200, 104th Cong. (1995).
81 Id.
s2 H.R. 1621, 104th Cong. (1995).
I' d. § l.
8" Id. § 2(b).
" See Sweeney, supra note 10, at 119.
86 Clinton Unveils Brownfields Tax Incentive, West's Legal News 3506, March 13, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 4157566.
S7 Id.
88 Id.
" Clinton Administration Announces $1.56 Billion Superfund Budget for Fiscal Year 1996,
7 No. 22 MEALY'S LITIG. REP.: SUPERFUND 12, February 22, 1995.
"o Elliott P. Laws, Measuring Superfknd's Success. I I (No. 12) ENVTL. COMPLIANCE &
LITIG. STRATEGY 4 (1996).
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agency broad discretion to enter into partial settlements involving
cleanup by private parties, it left little room for finality to be guaranteed
to settling parties.91 EPA has made efforts, however, to encourage the
redevelopment of brownfields. The agency has in place a Brownfield
Action Agenda which provides funding for communities nationwide for
40 pilot projects focusing on redevelopment of contaminated sites in
urban areas.9 Approximately 35 pilot projects will be added to the
Agenda.93 To further the effort to revitalize abandoned sites, the agency
has removed at least 28,000 sites from the list of Superfund sites thereby
relieving the stigma and vast liability associated with the sites.94
Finally, the agenda includes an indication by EPA of the intent to clarify
and provide more certainty regarding when it would enter into agree-
ments not to sue potential purchasers of contaminated sites.9
All states should strive for the federal/state cooperation that exists
in Minnesota. In May, 1995, EPA and the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency signed an agreement relieving those who voluntarily clean up
a contaminated site in compliance with the State's program from federal
Superfund Liability.96 EPA does reserve the right, however, to attach
liability in emergency situations. 97 But this scheme completes the circle
for redevelopment in Minnesota since developers cannot only be
relieved not only of future state liability but also of federal liability.98
While these federal initiatives indicate a willingness on the part of
the federal government to encourage brownfield redevelopment, the
lack of specific legislation to that effect makes the states the forerunner
in the effort. Furthermore, even in ajoint state and federal effort like in
Minnesota, the state must have in place comprehensive legislation that
passes EPA muster. Thus, state legislation is critical to solving the
brownfield dilemma.
*' Buzbee, supra note 74, at 61-5.
,' Laws, supra note 90, at * 1; Andrews, supra note 1, at 30.
Laws, supra note 90, at * 1.
', Id. Andrews, supra note 1, at 30.
'5 Andrews, supra note 1, at 30.
Borinsky, supra note 8, at 13.
9 Id.
"' This agreement has seemingly never been challenged as being beyond EPA's scope of
authority pursuant to CERCLA. The enactment of the proposed federal amendments to CERCLA,
however, would make this issue moot.
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II. GEORGIA: A LESSON IN PREVENTION
The State of Georgia recently enacted brownfield legislation to
combat what legislators considered potential problems.9 The new
legislation, effective July 1, 1996"" limits the cleanup liability of
prospective purchasers of abandoned sites."' While Georgia was not
experiencing the same rapid economic decline as the Rustbelt states,
legislators had sufficient foresight to attempt to prevent these
problems." 2 Georgia is one of the most industrialized states in the
southeast, and the detrimental effect of Superfund and state liability was
seen as a time-bomb waiting to explode.
A. The Motivation of the Georgia Legislature
In 1992, Georgia enacted the Georgia Hazardous Site Response
Act (GHSRA)103 in order to provide for clean up of contaminated sites
not encompassed by CERCLA.' °  The Environmental Protection
Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
collects fees charged by GHSRA for solid and hazardous waste
disposal. 5 The government uses these fees to clean up contaminated
sites." 6 When cleanup costs exceed the fund, the GHSRA lists certain
parties that may be held liable for the cleanup costs. 7
The fee system caused concern among small businesses, including
agribusiness, retail and recycling businesses that faced relatively high
fees and potentially devastating liability.'08 Additionally, owners
abandoned contaminated property and left it unrepaired. " Developers
" Interview with Rep. Denny Dobbs (Apr. 21, 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-96.3 (1996).
'0 GA. CODEANN. §§ 12-8-96.3, 12-8-200 to 207.
101 Id
11 See Shannan L. Freeman, Waste Management: Change Certain Hazardous Substance
Reporting Fees; Limit Liability of Subsequent Purchasers of Certain Property; Exempt Certain
Persons from Third-Party-Liability; Provide Corrective Action Plan for Certain Property, 13 GA.
ST. U.L. REv. 54, 56 (1996).
103 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-8-90 to 97 (1996).
14 Interview with Dobbs, supra note 99; see also Robert D. Mowrey, Georgia Goes
Superfund: A Look at the New Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1
(1992).
103 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-95.
1-' Id. § 12-8-95(b).
107 Id.
108 See Freeman, supra note 102, at 55-6.
'0 ld. at 56.
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lost interest in buying and rehabilitating land because of the potentially
devastating liability that ran with the land."Q As one of the Southeast's
biggest industrial states, this caused great concern among some
legislators. "' A strong proponent of brownfield legislation in Georgia,
Representative Danny Dobbs, believed that Georgia's economy was
headed for a crisis like that in the Rustbelt, something the Georgia
legislature wanted to prevent." 2
B. The Mechanics of the Limited Liability Legislation
In response to these economic concerns, the Georgia General
Assembly enacted two separate pieces of legislation in the 1996 General
Session. The first, O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.3, limits the liability of
subsequent purchasers for the prior release of hazardous substances." 3
In addition, the legislature created the Georgia Hazardous Site Reuse
and Redevelopment Act "" to encourage the purchase and rehabilitation
of affected property."'
1. Limit on Third-Party Liability
Prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96.3, a purchaser of
already affected property faced the possibility of a suit by a third
party.",6 As opposed to CERCLA, however, the liability provision in
the Georgia statute was limited.' ' ' Georgia's private right of action was
for contribution,"I but nevertheless, people were reluctant to purchase
affected land and lenders even avoided foreclosing, and both results
concerned lawmakers." 9
Legislators attempted to alleviate some of these concerns by
adding Code section 12-8-96.3 to the Hazardous Site Response Act. 2'
Clearly, the purpose of this section is to eliminate some liability for
'oId. at 56.
Id. Interview with Dobbs, supra note 99.
Interview with Dobbs, supra note 99.
' GA. CODEANN. § 12-8-96.3.
"4 GA. CODEANN. § 12-8-200.
"5 Freeman, supra note 102, at 59.
16 GA. CODE ANN. §.12-8-96.2 (1996).
" Mowrey, supra note 104, at 9 (a private right of action existed only with regard to
contribution; only the state had the right to bring an action for cleanup).
II8 Id.




developers so as to encourage them to recycle contaminated land.12
The legislation limits liability for buyers who meet certain eligibility
requirements."2 If the buyer meets the requirements, he or she is
exempt from third-party claims for contribution or third-party claims for
damages arising from a release of the hazardous waste, substance or
constituent)
2 3
The statute requires purchasers to submit a plan detailing the
actions he or she will take to bring the property into compliance. 24
Additionally, the purchaser must complete the plan within 12 months.'25
The one year provision is a compromise between legislators who wanted
to limit liability of all subsequent purchasers for past contamination and
environmental groups who consider the threat of a suit as their only
weapon.'26
2. Hazardous Site Reuse and Redevelopment
In an attempt to further encourage potential buyers to recycle
contaminated sites, the legislature enacted a new piece of legislation
entitled the Georgia Hazardous Site Reuse and Redevelopment Act. 127
This new Act provides limits on the potential criminal and civil liability
to be imposed by the State with regard to prospective purchasers and
developers. 2 The Act also delegates authority to the Board of Natural
Resources to establish regulations necessary to the implementation and
enforcement of the Act. 1
29
The Act provides certain criteria that purchasers must meet in
order to qualify for limited liability: the property must be abandoned or
in a state of disuse; the prospective purchasers must not have contrib-
uted to a release at the property; and, the purchaser must not be related
in any way to the previous owner. 30 The latter is designed to avoid
sham transactions intended to circumvent cleanup liability. 3 ' Addition-
121 Id.
122 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-96.3(b).
123 Id. § 12-8-96.3(c).
124 Id. § 12-8-96.3(b).
125 Id.
26 Freeman, supra note 102, at 58.
121 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-200.
121 Freeman, supra note 102, at 58.
129 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-8-202 to 203.
130 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-8-204(A), 12-8-205(a)-(b) (1996).
131 Freeman, supra note 102, at 59.
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ally, the purchaser must submit a corrective plan for bringing the
property into compliance. '32 The Director of the EPA must then
approve the plan."' The purchaser must complete the plan within the
time specified in the plan, rather than the 12 month period provided for
in section 12-8-96.3 of the Georgia Code.'34
C. The Impact of the New Brownfield Legislation
The legislation has only been in place since July, 1996, however,
to date, potential purchasers have applied for seven sites.'35
Representative Dobbs explains that unlike most legislation, public hype
did not precede the enactment of the statute.'3 6 Rather than reacting to
public concerns, lawmakers sought to prevent potential economic and
environmental problems. Now, groups such as the Atlanta Chamber of
Commerce are educating the business community in Georgia about the
brownfield option. I3
Additionally, Dobbs expects more changes in the legislation.'
Currently, the brownfield legislation only applies to abandoned sites.
Lawmakers decided to move in to the program slowly because of the
uncertainty of the administrative costs that would accompany the new
legislation.'39 Thus, now that the program has been in operation for
nearly a year, the legislature can assess the costs associated with the
program. If fiscally feasible, legislators predict an expansion in the
brownfield laws so that they apply to other contaminated sites, not just
those that are abandoned.'
40
,31 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-206 (1996).
133 Id.
"3 Id.








III. KENTUCKY: THE FIRST STEP TOWARD
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT
While Kentucky does have legislation on the books to encourage
the redevelopment of brownfields, it is more limited in scope than
Georgia. Nevertheless, Kentucky has made some effort to recycle
contaminated land. Furthermore, more legislation is likely to be
introduced in the 1998 Regular Session of the Kentucky General
Assembly.'4 '
A. The Motivation of the General Assembly
While environmental concerns in Kentucky are similar to those in
other states, Kentucky does have some unique problems. 42  For
instance, the presence of karst terrain makes contamination spread faster
throughout the soil and groundwater. 43 This is significant because
many Kentucky communities rely on well water as their primary source
of drinking water.'" Such specific environmental concerns make the
cleanup of abandoned sites necessary because, even though the sites sit
idle, they may actively contaminate the drinking water of many
Kentuckians.
These environmental concerns, however, did not prompt the
Kentucky Senate to pass KRS § 224.01-450 to 224.01-465. Instead, the
legislature intended to "encourage economic development.'
' 45
Kentucky's concern with the degradation of its urban areas, primarily
in Louisville, prompted the Jefferson County Senate Delegation to
introduce this legislation. 
146
The history of brownfield legislation in Kentucky can be traced to
the Brownfields Working Group in Louisville. The group is made up
of representatives of city, county and state governments; the Metropoli-
tan Sewer District; the Chamber of Commerce; the banking, real estate,
and legal community; the environmental engineering community; and,
' Interview with Senator Richie Sanders, Vice Chairman of the Senate Economic
Development Committee, Lexington, Ky. (Nov. 20, 1996).
'42 Interview with Feather, supra note 3 1.
143 Id.
144 Id.
4' KY. REV, STAT. ANN. § 224.01-450 (Supp. 1996)
4'6 Telephone Interview with Dan Riche, Staff Director, Natural Resources and Agriculture
Committees (Jan. 15, 1997).
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the Kentucky Resources Council. 47 The group was formed as a result
of President Clinton's 1994 Empowerment Zone Plan which provided
grant money to cities who had plans in place to improve certain urban
areas.'48 When the City of Louisville was going through the federal
grant application process, leaders realized that business and job growth
was being stifled by the existence of brownfields. 49 Thus, the
Brownfields Working Group was formed to focus on those abandoned
sites and to find a way to overcome the existing barriers of redeveloping
brownfields"'5
With the goal of revitalizing the abandoned sites to bring more
jobs to Louisville--particularly the west end-the group met to draft its
policies and begin its work.' EPA designated an abandoned site on
Garfield Avenue in Louisville's west end as a brownfield pilot project,
and the city's grant application was approved.' In November, 1995,
the group drafted its policy statement which included assigning grant
money to brownfield sites within Louisville, educating the public about
the potential cleanup of nearby sites, and introducing legislation to
alleviate future state liability for prospective purchasers who agree to
cleanup the contaminated sites.'53 More specifically, the proposed
legislation would allow Kentucky's Natural Resources and Environmen-
tal Protection Cabinet (the Cabinet) to issue a No Further Remediation
Letter to public entities who complete an approved remediation plan
which involves the cleanup of contaminated, abandoned sites.
54
B. Mechanics of the Statute
The newly enacted brownfield legislation'55 mimics the proposed
legislation of the Louisville Brownfield Working Group."5 6 The statute
allows public entities to apply to the cabinet for a No Further
"' Telephone Interview with Bonnie Biemer, Administrator of the Office of Health and the





152 Interview with Biemer, supra note 147.
's' Id. See Policy Document (November 8, 1995)(unpublished draft on file with author).
' Interview with Biemer, supra note 147; Proposed legislation (March 18, 1996)
(unpublished draft on file with author).
'5 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.01-450 to 224.01465. The legislation was effective July 15,
1996.
" See Proposed legislation, supra note 154.
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Remediation Letter for a contaminated property.' 7 The application
must include an environmental assessment of the site and a proposed
plan to alleviate the contamination as well as the intended use of the
land once the letter is obtained.' Upon application, the cabinet
approves or denies the application, or it enters into negotiations with the
public entity so as to develop a suitable remediation plan.'59 Once the
cabinet approves the plan and the public entity successfully completes
the plan, the cabinet issues the No Further Remediation Letter. 
60
The effect of the letter is significant to prospective purchasers of
contaminated sites. First, the letter signifies a successful, final
completion of the remediation plan.' 6' The letter also relieves the
purchaser of the contaminated site from further responsibility pursuant
to K.R.S. § 224.01-400 which allows the cabinet to seek reimbursement
for cleanup costs from parties responsible for the contamination. 62 The
letter also serves as prima facie evidence that the site poses no threat to
the environment and thus, requires no further remediation 63 This latter
effect only occurs when the purchaser utilizes the site in the way
reflected in the terms of the letter.' 64
The effects of the letter extend beyond the public entity to which
the cabinet issued the letter; the letter runs with the land so that financial
institutions who acquire control of the property are also relieved of
liability.16  While this does provide some incentive to financial
institutions to loan money for the purchase of a brownfield, the lender
still faces a risk of liability. The statute provides relief for financial
institutions only after the issuance of a No Further Remediation
Letter.' 66 Since the cabinet issues the letter only after successful
remediation, the lender must loan money without a guarantee of
successful remediation. The impact of this scheme is less significant in
Kentucky than other states, however, because only public entities can
apply for the letter. Thus, the only lenders adversely affected are those
who loan money to public entities to clean up a contaminated site, and




16' KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-465(1).
2 d. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400 is the state counterpart to CERCLA.
. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01465(1).
164 Id.
115 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-465(3)(e).
166 Id.
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public entities will likely qualify for grants or provide collateral separate
from the actual site. Only upon the failure of the public entity would a
lender face the aforementioned risk.
The requirement that a public entity be in the chain of title makes
Kentucky's statute different than many of the other states' brownfield
legislation.'67 The statute defines public entity as "the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, a county, city, urban-county government, charter county
government, or any of their agencies, departments, or any KRS § 58.180
nonprofit nonstock corporation."'1 Thus, a private purchaser may not
apply for a No Further Remediation Letter. Bonnie Biemer of the
Louisville Brownfield Working Group describes the process as a joint
effort between the public entity and a private prospective purchaser.'
69
Thus, the public entity gets into the chain of title and takes responsibil-
ity for the cleanup while a private purchaser is waiting to buy the clean
site. 70 The statute relieves subsequent owners of the site from future
liability that could have arisen from the previously contaminated site.17'
The public entity requirement has several explanations. First of
all, under CERCLA, municipalities have immunity from liability if, for
example, they foreclose on contaminated property for failure to pay
property taxes." While the result is less clear in the case of a voluntary
acquisition by a municipality, SARA (the amendments to CERCLA),
allows immunity for property acquired by means of eminent domain in
accordance with a brownfield clean up program.' 73 Thus, since federal
immunity already exists for municipalities, public entities are the most
likely to take the risk of ownership of an abandoned site. Second,
environmental concerns would seem to be furthered by this scheme. A
public entity might be more likely to ensure cleanup of the property than
a private purchaser who presumably is motivated solely by economic
concerns. Finally, the requirement of a public entity allows the
government to determine the target sites for cleanup. Thus, while a
prospective purchaser may want a particular site, a government entity
may only get involved in sites in which it has determined a priority site.
67 While pioneer states such as Minnesota have immunity for public entities built in to the
statute, this is in addition to other provisions for immunity for private purchasers. See Robert S.
Berger et al., supra note 28, at 111; Sweeney, supra note 10, at 133-34.
'8 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-455(2).
16 Interview with Biemer, supra note 147.
170 Id.
11 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-465(3).




C. The Future of Brownfields in Kentucky
As far as the Brownfield Working Group in Louisville is con-
cerned, they have accomplished one brownfield goal through the
passage of the state legislation." The next goal involves working with
the cabinet on a voluntary cleanup program that would allow the state
to administer cleanups pursuant to CERCLA. 7 5 As mentioned
previously, though, the state's hands are significantly tied regarding
federal CERCLA liability.
Other Kentucky legislators, however, are not satisfied with the
current state legislation. Senator Richard Sanders, Jr. 76 represents one
of many rural districts in the state. While the current legislation can be
used as a tool for small towns as well as urban areas,' the likelihood of
the state or local government entities getting involved in a brownfield
cleanup project is significantly less than the likelihood of such involve-
ment in the urban areas."7 ' As a result, many small business owners,
particularly of gas stations, who have lost their businesses due to the
statutorily mandated cleanup of hazardous contaminants have little hope
of restoring their livelihood. 7 9 Therefore, Senator Sanders intends to
introduce an amendment to the existing legislation in the 1998 regular
session of the General Assembly that would allow private purchasers to
apply for No Further Remediation Letters without the intervention of a
public entity. 8 °
IV. FLORIDA: UNCERTAIN EFFORT
TO REDEVELOP BROWNFIELDS.
Unlike Georgia and Kentucky, Florida has yet to adopt legislation
addressing the brownfield problem. However, Senator Jack Latvala,
Chairman of the Senate Natural Resources Committee, has publicly
stated that this will be his top priority in the 1997 Regular Session. 8'
174 Interview with Biemer, supra note 147.
175 Id
176 Vice Chairman of the Senate Economic Development Committee, Senator for Kentucky's
Ninth District.
1' Interview with Biemer, supra note 147.
"7 Interview with Sanders, supra note 141.
17 Id.
190 Id.
s ' Telephone interview with Missy Timmons, Senior Legislative Aid for Sen. Latvala (Jan.
18, 1997).
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Florida needs this legislation, perhaps more than any other state in the
Southeast because of its unique environmental concerns which directly
relate to its economy.
A. Why Brownfield Legislation is Crucial to the Sunshine State
Unlike Georgia, Florida's main attraction is not industry but
tourism.8 2 Thus, proponents of brownfield legislation in Florida seem
primarily concerned with cleaning up the land and preserving the beauty
of the state.'83 Ultimately, this cleanup will result in a boost for
Florida's economy which is so dependent on the tourist industry. The
premise is simple: if the state becomes unattractive because of
abandoned industrial sites, it loses tourists. Thus, while the direct
concern of Florida is the environment, a clean environment leads to a
stronger economy.
This is not to say that the industrial community in Florida should
be ignored. In fact, Florida is experiencing the highest population
influx in the nation.' Job growth must accompany this influx. The
Florida Manufacturing and Chemical Council, an advocacy group
representing the manufacturing industry, is encouraging the legislature
to pass brownfield redevelopment legislation.'lI The group's concern
seems to focus on maintaining an industrial work force, which com-
monly comes from the core urban areas. 8 6 Additionally, the degrada-
tion of the inner city areas makes the task of attracting new industry
more difficult.'87 The contaminated sites could not only be cleaned up,
but could also be put to their greatest use because of the existing
infrastructure.'
Florida has some serious environmental problems which would
only stand to improve with the enactment of brownfield legislation. For
example, in 1995 the legislature came under attack for its failure to
improve petroleum cleanup legislation.8 9 While Florida's legislation
I92 Id.
183 Id.
,u Telephone interview with Nancy Stevens, Executive Director ofthe Florida Manufacturing





I"a See generally. Robert W. Wells, Jr., Without "Rebecca, " Cost-Effective Environmental
Cleanup is an Oxymoron at Florida's Petroleum Contamination Sites, 70-Feb. FLA. B.J. 53 (1996).
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provided a program for the cleanup of petroleum, particularly near
drinking water sources, the mechanics of the program proved ineffi-
cient.'90 In addition, the conflicting interests of Florida's phosphate
mining industry and the preservation of the wetlands have historically
been a major concern in the state.'' In fact, phosphate mining has been
directly linked to degradation of freshwater wetlands.' 92 Operators of
mines have dumped phosphate residue in to the streams of Florida and
have been held strictly liable for the damage caused by the dumping.'93
With these types of threats to Florida's environment, brownfield
redevelopment could only help. Abandoned sites, even though not
actively contaminating, leave behind contaminants that seep into the
groundwater. Rather than leaving these sites idle, the state could
encourage their cleanup by providing incentives to prospective
purchasers who volunteer to cleanup the contamination.
B. The Future of Brownfields in Florida
Florida will almost certainly see some kind of brownfield
legislation enacted in the 1997 regular session of the legislature. 94
Informal working groups have been actively gathering useful data and
conducting hearings to help draft a meaningful brownfield redevelop-
ment statute. While Florida may be one step behind other states who
have already begun the redevelopment process, it has the advantage of
borrowing effective provisions from forerunner states and rejecting
those provisions which seem less effective.
Florida's immediate need for brownfield legislation stems from
environmental concerns. Thus, a scheme such as Kentucky's which
limits liability only for public entities might insure against business
motives overshadowing the pressing environmental necessity to clean
up the site. However, a statute limited to public entities might exclude
small business owners, an undesirable result since Florida is not a large
industrial state. Thus, it seems that Florida's best option is to provide
incentives to private purchasers yet carefully define and examine the
I Id.
,' See generally, Hope Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatory Policy: Up to its Ears in
Alligarors, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 307 (1991).
192 Id.
' See Barbara Gardner, Toxic Torts and Strict Liability, 30-Aug. HouS. LAW. 14,15 (1992)
(citing Cities Service Co. v. State of Florida, 312 So. 2d 799, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
"' As of the date of publication, no legislation had been enacted in Florida.
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requisite cleanup plan so as to make a heightened effort to protect the
environment. The legislature should use caution to avoid making
impossible cleanup standards, or else it will face the same criticism it
faced with the petroleum cleanup effort-inefficiency. 9 Therefore, it
is clear that Florida's legislature faces a tedious and cumbersome task.
The Florida legislature could look to Ohio for guidance. With the
environment as the primary concern, the legislature should maximize
the cleanup of contaminated sites by making voluntary cleanup an
option for private purchasers, yet the state should retain substantial
control over the remediation plan. In Ohio, private parties seeking to
obtain a no further action letter must utilize the services of a certified
laboratory and certified professional to verify the adequacy of the
remediation plan.'96 The legislation charges the Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency with promulgating rules and criteria for both the labs
and the professionals. 97 Thus, the state maintains control over the
formulation of the remediation plans yet private developers still have
incentive to voluntarily clean up abandoned contaminated areas."'
While virtually all states require state approval of the remediation
plan,' the Ohio legislation provides for a more active role for the state
to ensure proper cleanup.
Other measures enacted by different states also indicate a
willingness on the part of the government to help clean up the aban-
doned sites. Both Minnesota and Ohio provide financial assistance to
those who voluntarily clean up a site such as low-interest loans and
grant money.2" Tax incentives represent another example of legislation
encouraging the voluntary remediation.20 ' By enacting these volunteer-
friendly statutes, Florida will not only allow the revitalization of
abandoned sites but also encourage it.
Igs See generally Wells, supra note 189.
"6 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10(B)(l)(a)(b) (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
', OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.0 l(D)-(E); 3746.04(5) (Banks-Baldwin 1996).
But see Opponents Criticize Ohio's Voluntary Cleanup Program, WEST'S LEGAL NEws
9515, 1996 WL 510543 (September 11, 1996) (criticizing the standards in Ohio as too relaxed)
' See generally Andrew, supra note 1; Borinsky, supra note 8.
20o Andrew, supra note 1, at 29-30.
201 Sweeney, supra note 10, at 122.
[VOL. 12:141
1996-97] BROWNFIELD LEGISLATION 165
CONCLUSION.
States in the Southeast should strive for a balance. They must
encourage the redevelopment and cleanup of contaminated areas, but
they must not do so at the expense of the environment via standards that
are too relaxed. Therefore, incentives to both private and public
prospective purchasers of the sites along with continued governmental
control over the cleanup should be the goal of Southeastern state
legislatures in enacting its new brownfield redevelopment legislation.

